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Abstract. This article contends that theories of evolutionary psychology do not escape two flaws in 
approaches to psychological explanation. 
 
Theories of evolutionary psychology attempt to explain aspects of psychological phenomena through 
theories of modern evolutionary theory. The presence or absence, contingency or a contingency, and 
strength or weakness of psychological phenomena are alleged to be dependent on natural selection, 
adaptation, and more recently-discussed processes and states such as exaptation, spandrels, and 
functionless by-products. 
 
Currently, there is very significant dialogue among evolutionary psychological theoreticians about the 
relative roles and import of these processes and states contributing psychological explanation. (1) When 
and how often are exaptations, spandrels, or adaptations more theoretically robust? (2) Can 
developmental sequences of genetic-environmental interactions become well-delineated through 
research? (3) Can inherited variants facilitating environmental survival become well-delineated from 
those variants directly facilitating reproductive success? (4) Can a specific adaptation's environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness be well-delineated? (5) Can constraints on optimal design such as (a) time lags 
between a new adaptive problem and the evolution of a mechanism designed to solve it or (b) the 
coordination of adaptations with other mechanisms be well-delineated in specific cases? (6) Can 
confusions and difficulties be resolved in specific situations about the current utility and past 
functionality (active or inactive) of exaptations and adaptations? 
 
An ever-widening range of psychological phenomena--e.g., superior female spatial location memory, 
landscape preferences, and sex differences in sexual fantasy--have been treated to evolutionary 
psychological analyses and attempts at addressing the above questions. However, one might agree that 
two flaws of past approaches to psychological explanation--psychodynamic, behavioral, cognitive, 
humanistic, and existential--remain. 
 
First, as with many criminal justice system investigations (prosecutorial and defense) data collection and 
interpretation seems an exercise not in seeking the truth, a truth, or even a resonating narrative, but in 
making a case. Second, psychological explanation is founded on the presumption of meaning--
overarching evolutionary constructs as opposed to unconscious dynamics, conditioning history, self-
actualization, or meaning itself. That psychological functioning has no rhyme nor reason--even if one's 
phenomenology suggests otherwise--is not entertained. Note here that even existential philosophies 
that attempt to address the notion that there is no meaning have not escaped the confines of defining 
nothing as something that is not something. 
 
A revolution as opposed to an evolution in psychological explanation, for psychobiography, 
psychohistory, and political psychology, awaits the same intellectual breakthrough as awaits one in 
cosmology--resolving the meaning of before the beginning when before the beginning there is no 
beginning nor end. (See Buss, D.M., Haselton, M.G., Shackelford, T.K., Bleske, A.L., & Wakefield, J.C. 
(1998). Adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels. American Psychologist, 53, 533-548; Ellis, B.J., & 
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Symons, D. (1990). Sex differences in sexual fantasy: An evolutionary psychological approach. Journal of 
Sex Research, 27, 527-556; Orions, G.H., & Heerwagen, J.H. (1992). Evolved responses to landscapes. In 
J.H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind (pp. 55-580). NY: Oxford University Press; 
Silverman, I., & Eals, M. (1992). Sex differences in spatial abilities: Evolutionary theory and data. In J.H. 
Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind (pp. 533-549). NY: Oxford University Press.) 
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